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TO: Mr. George Tenet
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate

OCA Record

OCA 86-1952

Enclosed are the papers as a result of
your briefing yesterday.


Chief, Senate Branch

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STAT

Current listing of: T4062:2
 Slug:(USIA ALERT)
 Category:FBIS

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 Date: 05/31/86 05:10:10
 Story: 023

TASS CARRIES SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON SALT II
 TAKE 1 OF 2 -- SOVIET STATEMENT ON SALT II
 LD310835 MOSCOW TASS IN ENGLISH 0818 GMT 31 MAY 86
 (TEXT) MOSCOW MAY 31 TASS -- FOLLOWS THE FULL TEXT OF THE SOVIET
 GOVERNMENT STATEMENT:

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS TAKEN A STEP WHICH AGAIN
 IN ALL OBVIOUSNESS REVEALS THE ESSENCE OF THE CURRENT U.S. FOREIGN-
 POLICY COURSE AIMED AT SPIRALLING UP THE ARMS RACE IN EVERY WAY, AT
 MILITARIZING OUTER SPACE, AND AT HEIGHTENING INTERNATIONAL TENSION.

ON MAY 27, THIS YEAR, PRESIDENT REAGAN ANNOUNCED A VIRTUAL
 REFUSAL OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUBSEQUENTLY OBSERVE THE SOVIET-
 U.S. LEGAL TREATY DOCUMENTS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
 ARMS -- THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE 1979 SALT-2 TREATY. HE
 STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE BOUND BY STRATEGIC ARMS
 LIMITATION AGREEMENTS IN FUTURE DECISIONS CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT
 OF U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES.

THUS, WHAT THE SOVIET UNION WARNED ABOUT HAS HAPPENED. THE U.S.
 ADMINISTRATION, OF ALL VERSIONS OF ITS POSSIBLE ACTIONS AS REGARDS
 THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS, ADOPTED
 PRECISELY THE ONE WHICH UNDERMINES THE FOUNDATION OF THE PROCESS OF
 LIMITING AND REDUCING SUCH ARMS. CONFRONTED WITH THE CHOICE
 WHETHER IT SHOULD MODERATE ITS OWN ARMS PROGRAMMES OR OPEN THE
 FLOODGATE FOR AN UNCONTROLLED RACE OF ARMS, WASHINGTON PREFERRED
 THE LATTER. THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION SIGNIFIES THAT THE PRESENT
 U.S. LEADERSHIP HAS RESORTED TO AN EXCEPTIONALLY DANGEROUS MEASURE
 IN THE CAUSE OF DESTROYING THE TREATY SYSTEM WHICH CURBS THE NUCLEAR
 ARMS RACE AND THEREBY CREATES CONDITIONS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF NEW
 AGREEMENTS.

CONCRETELY, A U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SALT-2 TREATY IS
 PROGRAMMED FOR THE END OF THE CURRENT YEAR WHEN IN THE PROCESS OF
 DEPLOYING NEW ARMS, HEAVY BOMBERS WITH CRUISE MISSILES, IN
 PARTICULAR, THE USA WILL OVERSTEP THE LIMIT OF 1,320 MIRVED
 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTLY STATED THAT THE
 USA WOULD NOT DISMANTLE AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF EXISTING ARMS TO
 KEEP WITHIN THE SALT-2 LIMITS.

(MORE)

31 MAY 0901Z JTD

DC:
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Current listing of: T4080:2
Slug:(USIA ALERT)
Category:FBIS

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Date: 05/31/86 05:48:50
Story: 025

TAKE 2 OF 2 -- 023 (SOVIET STATEMENT ON SALT II)
///THE SALT-2 LIMITS.
LD310857

(TEXT) THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HAS VIRTUALLY TAKEN A COURSE TOWARDS FULLY IMPLEMENTING AN ALL-EMBRACING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR BUILD-UP PROGRAMME WHICH WAS ADOPTED BY IT AND WHICH TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IS RESTRAINED BY THE SALT AGREEMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE USA INTENDS, ALONG WITH THE DEPLOYMENT OF B-52 AND B-1B BOMBERS WITH LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES, TO DEVELOP THE SECOND NEW TYPE OF ICBM "MIDGETMAN", TO DEPLOY ANOTHER 50 MX ICBMS, AND TO SPEED UP THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN 'ADVANCED CRUISE MISSILE'. IT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT WORK WILL BE CONTINUED TO DEVELOP SPACE STRIKE WEAPONS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE "STAR WARS" PROGRAMME.

THE DISMANTLING OF TWO POSEIDON MISSILE-CARRYING SUBMARINES, SCHEDULED FOR THE NEAREST PERIOD IN VIEW OF THE COMMISSIONING OF THE EIGHTH TRIDENT SUBMARINE, IS OFFICIALLY EXPLAINED BY BUDGET FUNDS SAVING CONSIDERATIONS, AND NOT BY A DESIRE TO OBSERVE THE SALT-2 TREATY PROVISIONS.

ATTEMPTS ARE BEING MADE TO JUSTIFY ALL THAT BY CERTAIN "VIOLATIONS" OF THE AGREEMENTS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. BUT SUCH ASSERTIONS ARE UNFOUNDED FROM BEGINNING TO END. THERE HAVE NOT BEEN AND ARE NO SUCH VIOLATIONS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT KNOWS THAT WELL. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY EXPOSED ON THE STRENGTH OF FACTS WASHINGTON'S ATTEMPTS AT LEVELLING FAR-FETCHED ACCUSATIONS AT THE SOVIET UNION WITH THE INTRODUCTION OF EACH NEW U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMME WHICH DOES NOT FIT INTO THE EXISTING TREATY LIMITS.

THE PRINCIPLED APPROACH OF THE USSR TO THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS IN THE ARMS LIMITATION FIELD IS KNOWN. THE SOVIET SIDE OBSERVED AND OBSERVES, STRICTLY AND IN FULLY (AS RECEIVED) VOLUME, ALL THE COMMITMENTS TAKEN BY IT. IN DOING SO, IT PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT THE CONTINUED OBSERVANCE, ON A MUTUAL BASIS, OF THE OBLIGATIONS FORMULATED BY THE SALT-2 TREATY WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE AND THE ENHANCEMENT OF SECURITY.

HOWEVER, THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS GUIDED BY DIFFERENT CONSIDERATIONS, EARLIER, TOO, IT DID MUCH TO UNDERMINE THE SALT-2 TREATY THAT WAS A RESULT OF MANY YEARS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE 70S IN THE CAUSE OF TERMINATING THE RACE IN NUCLEAR-MISSILE WEAPONS AND OF PROMOTING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

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OFIRST, THE NON-RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY, AND THEN, THE CIRCUMVENTION OF ITS PROVISIONS THROUGH THE DEPLOYMENT OF FIRST STRIKE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE -- THE BALLISTIC PERSHING-2 MISSILES AND CRUISE MISSILES -- THE DEPARTURE FROM ITS INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS, AND NOW, AN OUTRIGHT RENUNCIATION OF THE TREATY.

ALL THIS IS MAKING MORE OBVIOUS STILL WHY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HOLDS SUCH AN UNCONSTRUCTIVE STAND IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS, JUST AS IN THE QUESTION OF WHAT A NEW SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING SHOULD BE LIKE. AT THE SAME TIME THIS CONFIRMS THE WELL-GROUNDED CHARACTER OF THE SOVIET VIEW TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH A MEETING REQUIRES THE READINESS OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE RESULTS ON AT LEAST ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY, AND ALSO THE EXISTENCE OF A RELEVANT POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE CHALLENGING MOVE MADE BY THE UNITED STATES IN NO WAY ATTESTS TO EITHER ONE OR THE OTHER.

IT SHOULD ALSO BE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT WILL NOT WATCH IMPARTIALLY HOW THE UNITED STATES IS BREAKING DOWN THE AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE SPHERE OF THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE AMERICAN SIDE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS THAT IT WILL MANAGE TO GET MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR ITSELF AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY OF OTHERS.

AS SOON AS THE USA GOES BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED LEVELS OF ARMS OR OTHERWISE VIOLATES THE OTHER MAIN PROVISIONS OF THE MENTIONED AGREEMENTS OBSERVED BY THE SIDES UNTIL NOW, THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONSIDER ITSELF FREE FROM THE RELEVANT COMMITMENTS UNDER THE 1972 INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE SALT-2 TREATY AND WILL TAKE THE NECESSARY PRACTICAL STEPS TO PREVENT THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC PARITY FROM BEING UPSET. THESE MEASURES WILL RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE UNITED STATES ACQUIRING ADVANTAGES IN THE MAIN TYPES OF NEW STRATEGIC ARMS WHICH IT IS DEVELOPING NOW AND WHICH IT INTENDS TO PHASE INTO SERVICE.

THE SOVIET UNION WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE ALL MEASURES IN ORDER TO ENSURE RELIABLY THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING NECESSARY TO ENHANCE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

(ENDALL)

31 MAY 0939Z JTD